W&M ScholarWorks
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects

Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects

1993

Transitivity of Probability and Strength: A Test of Three
Discounting Models
Ann Marie Carosella
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd
Part of the Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
Carosella, Ann Marie, "Transitivity of Probability and Strength: A Test of Three Discounting Models"
(1993). Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects. Paper 1539625848.
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-ppn4-j629

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu.

TRANSITIVITY OF PROBABILITY AND STRENGTH:
A TEST OF THREE DISCOUNTING MODELS

A Thesis

Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of Psychology
The College of William and Mary in Virginia

In Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirement for the Degree of
Master of Arts

by
Ann Marie Carosella
1993

APPROVAL SHEET

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirement for the degree of

Master of Arts

Ann Marie Carosella

Approved, March, 1993

Kelly G./ Shaver, Ph.D.

£

John B. Nezlek, Ph.D.

Deborah Foss-Goodman, Ph.D

DEDICATION
This work is lovingly dedicated to my mother and father,
Mary Elizabeth and Nicholas Charles Carosella,
both of whom have been unwavering in their support.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

........................................

V

LIST OF T A B L E S ............................................ vi
LIST OF F I G U R E S ..............

vii

A B S T R A C T ................................................ viii
INTRODUCTION

............................................

2

M E T H O D .................................................... 26
RESULTS

32

D I S C U S S I O N ................................................ 40
R E F E R E N C E S .............................................

47

T A B L E S ......................................

51

F I G U R E S .................................................... 56

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Although it has been several years since I left the College
of William and Mary to continue my education at other
institutions, the importance of the years spent at the
College of William and Mary remain unequalled in terms of
education and professional development.
For this, I am
grateful for the support, guidance and friendship of all the
members of the Psychology Department.
Special thanks are extended to the members of my thesis
committee, Deborah Foss-Goodman and John Nezlek for the role
their guidance and thoughtful comments made in the
completion of this thesis.
For helping with the paperwork
and keeping track of the deadlines, I want to thank Kathy
Morgan.
I am especially grateful to my thesis advisor,
Kelly Shaver, whose advise continues to prove invaluable as
I attempt to navigate through the world of academics.
Of course, school (even graduate school) cannot be all work.
For sharing their hearts as well as their professional
expertise, I would like to thank Deborah Foss-Goodman,
Michael Rohrbaugh, Deborah Ventis, Kelly Shaver and their
families.
Finally, I would like to thank my husband, Jeffrey Lackner,
for his unceasing support and encouragement and for shaping
this thesis with his editorial and theoretical assistance.
I even appreciate his thoughtful reminders (read "proddings"
or "nudges") of the need to complete this thesis. Although
hesitant to give me his phone number on the first day of
graduate school, we haven't stopped talking since.

v

LIST OF TABLES
Table

Page
1.

Mean Probability Scores for One, Two,
and Three Cause Situations For EventsGiven and Causes-Given Legal and
Interpersonal Situations
.....................

51

2.

Mean Strength Scores For One, Two, and
Three Cause Situations For Events-Given
and Causes-Given Legal and Interpersonal
S i t u a t i o n s ......................................52

3.

Mean Probability and Strength Estimates
for One Cause Legal and Interpersonal
Situations in Events-Given and CausesGiven C o n d i t i o n s ............................... 53

4.

Mean Probability Ratings for Causes for
Each of the Six Interpersonal and Six
Legal S i t u a t i o n s ............................... 54

5.

Probability Estimates for Each Cause
Presented in Multiple Cause Situations
as a Function of Presentation O r d e r ............ 55

vi

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure
1.

Page
Compensatory Schema for an Event with
Two C a u s e s ......................................56

ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the ability of the
discounting models of causal schemata (Kelley, 1972),
multiple discrete causes (Shaver, 1981) and minimum
causation (Shaklee & Fischhoff, 1982) to predict probability
and strength attributions for causes and events.
Discounting refers to reductions in the perceived strength,
probability, or importance of causal factors that occur when
more than one causal factor is assumed present. According
to Kelley's model, the role of each potential causes is
considered independently, leading to a linear pattern of
discounting.
Hypothesizing that combinations of causes are
evaluated in addition to individual causes, Shaver's
multiple discrete cause model proposes a nonlinear pattern
of discounting.
In contrast, Shaklee and Fischhoff's
minimum causation model predicts complete discounting of
additional causes once a single cause is found to be
sufficient for an event to occur. Transitivity of
discounting, or the extent to which judgments regarding the
presence or absence of possible causes of a given event were
similar to judgments regarding the presence or absence of
events given a particular set of causes, also was examined.
Finally, this study compared discounting for legal and
interpersonal situations.
Sixty-five male and 84 female undergraduates were presented
with 6 legal and 6 interpersonal situations, 2 of each
associated with 1, 2, and 3 causes.
In the events-given
condition, subjects were asked to judge the probability and
strength of each of the one, two, or three causes presented.
In the causes-given condition, subjects were asked to judge
the probability and strength of a potential event.
The results of this study suggest that both the minimum
causation model and the causal schema model predict
discounting in various situations.
Little evidence was
found to support the multiple discrete cause model.
Nontransitivity of discounting and the absence of a single
pattern of discounting across situations suggest that no
single attribution model can account satisfactorily for the
wide variety of situations confronted by individuals.
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Introduction
The study of causal attribution is fundamentally
important to the understanding of both interpersonal and
intrapersonal behaviors.

Variations in causal ascription

have been found to affect a wide variety of phenomena
including cancer mortality (Taylor, Lichtman, & Wood, 1984),
prejudice (Rothbart, Evans, & Fulero, 1979), and level of
depression (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978).

In the

legal system, assignment of causality takes on societal
importance, determining guilt or innocence, and consequently
whether an individual faces incarceration or freedom.
Whether the event in question is a failed relationship, an
automobile accident, or a gruesome murder, the goals behind
attributional judgments remain the same: to provide an
understanding of the situation and a feeling of control over
future events.
Among attribution theories, Kelley's models of
covariation and causal schemata (1967, 1972, 1973) perhaps
are the most influential descriptions of the processes by
which actor and environmental causal forces are
distinguished.

According to Kelley's principle of

covariation, perceivers provided several opportunities to
study a situation use distinctiveness, consistency and
consensus information to attribute the event to the cause
"with which, over time, it covaries" (Kelley, 1973, p. 108).
If a particular event occurs only in the presence of a
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particular entity and does not occur in the presence of
other entities, distinctiveness is considered high with
respect to that entity.

Consistency refers to the extent to

which an event occurs each time a particular entity and a
particular actor are present together.

Consensus

information provides attributional clues by addressing
whether or not people other than the perceiver experience
the same effect when in the presence of the same entity.
Different combinations of high and low distinctiveness,
consistency, and consensus information lead to attributions
to either the actor, the situation, or the entity.
According to Kelly, an event with low consensus, low
distinctiveness, and high consistency would lead to a trait
attribution.

In contrast, this model suggests that an event

marked by high distinctiveness, low consistency, and low
consensus would lead to a situation attribution.

Using an

experimental paradigm in which subjects receive ambiguous
information contrasting the reaction of the actor with the
reaction of other actors (consensus), an actor's response to
an entity with his or her response to other entities
(distinctiveness) and the consistency of the interaction of
the actor and the entity with interactions with other actors
and other entities (consistency), past research (Major,
1980; McArthur, 1972) suggests that people attend to each of
the three types of covariation information, relying most
heavily on consistency information and least heavily on
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consensus information.

Although not yet subjected to

adequate empirical test, the PEAT model recently proposed by
Medcof (1990) suggests the need for an experimental paradigm
that provides less ambiguous comparisons of the probability
of an event in the presence and absence of particular
actors, entities, and the combinations of specific actors
and entities.

According to Medcof, more precise probability

information would allow subjects to contrast probabilities
across the three domains of actors, entities, and
actor/entity combinations as well as within the three
domains.

Medcof argues that the ambiguous information

presented in past research does not allow subjects to make
comparisons across domains, and thus provides an opportunity
to examine only a small proportion of possible combinations
of high and low consistency, consensus, and distinctiveness
information (Medcof, 1990).
When repeated observations are not possible and causal
information is limited, Kelley suggests that causal schemata
are used to conduct attributional searches.

These causal

schemata are abstract conceptions of the interactions among
potential causes that provide a framework for the inference
of cause-effect relationships in ambiguous situations.
According to Kelley, schemata facilitate causal analysis,
but are not as accurate as more complete techniques,
permitting only "reasonably good" causal inferences to be
drawn (Kelley, 1972, p. 152).
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Two main categories of schemata, multiple necessary
causal schema (MNC) and multiple sufficient causal schema
(MSC) are proposed in Kelley's schema model.

The MSC schema

model describes situations in which, although several
factors could produce an event, only one needs to be present
for the effect to occur.

In contrast, the MNC schema model

assumes that the presence of each of two or more causes is
necessary for the production of an event.

In the presence

of only one of the necessary causes, the event will not
occur.

Using variations of these two "thought models",

Kelley proposes that the lay attributor has a wide
"repertoire of causal schemata" (p. 118, 1973).
Some of the schemata variations Kelley describes (1972)
assume that the attributor is able to distinguish not only
between the presence or absence of causes and effects, but
also among degrees of causation, or variations in causal
strength.

In contrast to this view, Shaver's (1981) model

of multiple discrete causes asserts that individuals do not
recognize degrees of causation.

Whether people do or do not

believe that causes can vary in strength is an important
question to explore in order to understand the process by
which people make attributions in multiple cause situations.
Although these two models make different predictions
regarding how people evaluate each cause as the number of
causes increases, the models have not been compared
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empirically.

In the following sections, these two models

will be discussed and their opposing hypotheses outlined.
Kellev's Causal Schema Model
According to Kelley's causal schema model (1972), both
causes and effects can be perceived as either discrete or
quantitatively graded in strength.

When a cause is

discrete, the effect occurs in the presence of the cause and
does not occur in its absence.

In contrast, an effect may

not result even in the presence of a cause if the cause is
of insufficient strength to produce an effect by itself and
it is not combined with a second causal force.

A gunshot

wound to the heart is a discrete cause because its mere
presence leads to the death of the victim.

In contrast,

because studying does not lead always to the desired effect
of a passing grade, an activity such as studying for an exam
could be conceptualized as a graded cause.

In some

situations, the causal force of studying may be present
without bringing about the desired effect of a passing grade
if the studying is not of sufficient "strength", or if the
ease of the exam does not combine with a lesser amount of
studying to produce a passing grade.
Use of graded causes is assumed in Kelley's
compensatory schema, a variation of the MSC schema (1972).
It is thought that people use the compensatory schema to
evaluate cause-event relationships when the event could be
produced by any one of several potential causes if the one
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cause is of sufficient strength, or when the event could be
produced if several causes of lesser strength are combined.
The compensatory schema model proposes that each of the
quantitatively graded causes is ranked on the schema
structure according to increasing strength.

Consider the

schema for an event with two quantitatively graded causes
diagrammed in Figure 1.

On the vertical side, Cause 1 is

nonexistent in the left upper corner and is of greatest
strength in the left lower corner.

On the horizontal axis,

Cause 2 is absent in the left corner and is strongest in the
right corner.

In this example, the effect is present when

either Cause 1 or Cause 2 is present and is of high
strength, or when both are present and at least one is of
moderate strength.

When both causes are of low strength, or

only one cause is present and is of low or moderate
strength, the effect does not occur.
Given information regarding the presence or absence of
an effect, use of this schema allows inferences to be drawn
regarding the presence and strength of these two causes.
Conversely, if the perceiver knows whether or not the
various causal forces are present, he or she can make
inferences regarding the presence and strength of the
effect.

Referring back to the studying example, the

compensatory schema would predict that either moderate
studying or a moderately easy exam would lead to a passing
grade.

The magnitude of the passing grade could range from
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a grade of "D" to a grade of "A+" depending on the
particular combination of studying effort and exam
difficulty.

Thus, this model assumes that people can

distinguish between degrees of effects as well as between
degrees of causal strength.
When more than one causal force is involved in an
event, Kelley proposes two rules by which a person can make
causal inferences.

These rules of augmentation and

discounting require that people consider causes to be either
facilitative or inhibitory.

A facilitative cause is a cause

that increases the likelihood of an event, whereas an
inhibitory cause reduces the likelihood that an event will
occur.

If an event occurs despite the presence of an

inhibitory cause, Kelley states that perceivers employ the
augmentat ion principle (1972).

Perceiving an event to occur

in the presence of an inhibitory cause, the attributor
infers that a facilitative cause must also be present and
must be of adequate strength to overcome the effects of the
inhibitory cause.

Consequently, the strength of this

facilitative cause is perceived to be greater than it would
have been to produce the event in the absence of the
inhibitory cause.
In the presence of more than one facilitative cause,
Kelley predicts that discounting will occur.

The

discounting principle states that "the role of a given cause
in producing a given effect is discounted if other plausible
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causes are also present.” (Kelley, 1973, p. 113).

According

to this principle, when told of an event of constant
magnitude and the presence of two or more causes, an
attributor will reduce the perceived strength of each cause
in order that the combined strength of the causes is equal
to the strength of the effect.

Reduction in strength is

assumed to proceed in a linear function with the addition of
each new causal element.

If the effect varies in strength

as causes are added, Kelley proposes an additive effects
schema, such that as one or both causes increase in
strength, the strength of the resulting effect increases as
well.

When both the effect and one cause of sufficient

strength to produce the effect are known to be present, the
discounting principle suggests that predictions regarding
the presence of additional causes will be marked with
ambiguity.
Judgments regarding discounting, as well as causeeffect relationships in general, assume that individuals are
capable of probabilistic judgments.

Although probability

judgments have been found to be biased by cognitive
heuristics such as salience (Fiske & Taylor, 1991),
availability and representativeness (Tversky & Kahneman,
1973; 1974), it is appropriate for several reasons to
discuss probability estimates in the context of attribution
judgments.

First, by their very nature, attributional

judgments require perceivers to make judgments regarding

causes they think are most likely to be responsible for an
effect.

Second, these probability judgments generally

involve relative ratings of probability rather than precise
judgments.

Thus, what is important in reference to

discounting is whether or not attributors assume that the
likelihood that any particular cause was responsible for an
effect is reduced as new causes become evident, not the
actual probability rating assigned to any one particular
cause.

Furthermore, past research (e.g. Cheng & Novick,

1990; Dunning, & Parpal, 1989; Leddo, Abelson, & Gross,
1984) indicates that subjects are able to evaluate the
probabilistic connection between various causes and
particular events.

According to Medcof (1990), if

attributional theory is to move toward maturity, research
will need to use paradigms that address the probabilistic
nature of judgments less ambiguously than frequently done in
the past (e.g. Major, 1980; McArthur, 1972).
Shaver's Multiple Discrete Cause Model
In contrast to Kelley's model employing continuously
graded causes, Shaver's multiple discrete model (1981)
recognizes only discrete causes.

Invoking the Aristotelian

philosophical tradition, Shaver claims that quantitatively
graded causes present conceptual and logical problems.
Defining a cause as discrete, or ”a thing or event that by
its mere presence, produces an effect,” (Shaver, 1981, p.
353) Shaver disagrees with Kelley's view that a cause may be
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present, but of insufficient strength to produce an effect.
By adding conditions of strength to the requirement of
presence, Shaver argues that graded effects "destroy[s] the
category assignment rule inherent in the definition"
p. 353) of a cause.

(1981,

To avoid the inconsistency inherent in

defining causes as both graded and discrete, Shaver proposes
the adoption of a multiple discrete cause approach.
According to Shaver, the defining characteristic of a
cause is that it contributes to the production of an effect.
Using this definition, any force that is present but does
not produce an effect is not a cause.

This multiple

discrete cause model states that changes in an effect are
not produced by a change in the strength of a cause, but
rather changes in the number or nature of other causal
elements.

Furthermore, this model states that causal

elements of different "magnitude" are qualitatively
different, not simply variations of a single cause.

Thus,

"to study" and "to study hard" are two discrete causes, not
a variation of a single cause.

The absence of these would

be "not to study" or "not to study hard," rather than "not
to study hard enough," which implies continuous degrees of
effort.
Although he does not outline the proposal in detail,
Shaver suggests that this approach logically would extend to
the concept of discrete, rather than graded, effects as
well.

According to this approach, the effects produced by
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greater numbers of causal elements would not differ in
magnitude, but rather in kind.

Thus, to receive a "D" on an

exam, and to receive an ,,A+" on the same exam are not two
points on a continuum, but are two distinct events.
The multiple discrete cause approach focuses its
criticism of Kelley's causal schema model on the
compensatory causal schema.

Arguing that the definition of

a cause as an inhibitory force contradicts the definition of
a cause as that which contributes to the production of an
outcome, Shaver recommends that this term be replaced by the
term obstacle.

Shaver also argues that to label a cause as

facilitative is repetitive and confusing.

Thus, according

to Shaver, a facilitative force should be referred to simply
as a cause.
The multiple discrete cause model does not rule out the
possibility that more than one cause may be involved in the
production of an effect.

In Shaver's model, the concept of

graded causes is replaced with the concepts of minimally
sufficient causal subsets and redundant causal subsets.
minimally sufficient subset is any set of causes that is
capable of creating an effect only if all the elements of
the set are present.

Within each minimally sufficient

causal subset, each causal element is discrete and
nonredundant in that each causal element is necessary for
the occurrence of the effect.

A
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Because many events can happen in a variety of ways,
the attributor is often faced with the task of assessing
redundant subsets.

These redundant subsets consist of

elements contained in multiple subsets.

In the case of the

effect with two possible causes portrayed in Figure 1, the
causal combination of Cause 1: High Strength + Cause 2: Low
Strength, and the causal subset of Cause 1: High Strength
are redundant causal subsets because they both contain Cause
1: High Strength.
Like Kelley's model, Shaver's model predicts that the
role of each cause will be discounted as the number of
causes increases.

The two models differ, however, on the

actual form this discounting would take.

Whereas Kelley's

theory states that discounting should proceed in a linear
fashion as a function of the actual number of causes
considered, Shaver states that discounting should increase
in a nonlinear fashion as a function of the number of
combinations of redundant and nonredundant causal elements.
Shaver (1981) outlines several advantages his model
provides over Kelley's model.

First, this model avoids the

definitional confusion inherent in identifying causes
sometimes by their mere presence, and distinguishing between
causes of differing strength at other times.

Second, the

multiple discrete cause approach restates both discounting
and augmentation principles in clear presence-absence terms.
Finally, because intent can be more clearly discerned in
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qualitatively different events than events that differ only
in magnitude, Shaver argues that his model's fine-grained
analysis of events is more closely aligned with recent
advances proposed by reasons-explanation philosophers to
explain human action in terms of intentionality.
Despite the clear advantages Shaver's model offers, the
extent to which his model captures the attributional process
is unclear.

Although it is logical to discuss causes and

events in terms of presence or absence rather than in terms
of amounts of presence or absence, it is important to know
how the naive perceiver use these concepts.

Because one of

the main purposes of the theory of attribution is to
determine how causality is assigned in everyday situations,
it seems logical that the definitions of fundamental
concepts should reflect common usage.
Although results from numerous studies suggest that
attributors discount the importance of multiple causal
elements in some fashion, a direct comparison of Kelley's
linear model with Shaver's nonlinear model does not exist.
Thus, it is impossible to determine which model best depicts
the process by which discounting proceeds.

Perhaps in part

because Shaver's model has been proposed more recently
(1981) and waits to be tested empirically, Kelley's concepts
of graded causes and effects typically are used to explain
empirical evidence of discounting.

Use of Kelley's theory

to explain much of present empirical evidence, however,
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cannot rule out the value of Shaver's theory as an
alternative explanation for discounting practices.
An example of discounting explained with Kelley's
causal .schema model is Cunningham and Kelley's (1975) study
of attributions for "normal” and "extreme" outcomes.
Hypothesizing that people use a multiple necessary causal
schema to explain the occurrence of an event more often when
the event in question is of great magnitude, the authors
asked subjects for inferences of causes for interpersonal
events and news stories of both ordinary and extreme
magnitude.

Subjects were asked to judge on a 7-point scale

the extent to which each of several causes contributed to
the event.

The results appeared to support the authors'

prediction that people switch from a multiple sufficient
causal schema to a multiple necessary causal schema as the
magnitude of an event increases, making attributions to more
than one cause when the event in question is of great
magnitude, but making attributions to only one of the
possible causes when the event in question is a more
"normal" moderate one.
This study suggested that subjects perceive at least
two kinds of multiple necessary causal schemata, an emergent
effects schema and a resultant effects schema.

Emergent

effects schemata have several causes that contribute in
unique combination such that their effect is not simply the
sum of the individual contributions (Kelley, 1972).

In
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contrast, resultant effect schemas describe results that are
produced by the composite, or additive effect of two or more
causes (Kelley, 1972).

The additive schema is very similar

to a multiple sufficient cause schema in that an effect will
appear in the presence of either of the causes, as well as
in the presence of both causes.

This schema assumes that

attributors not only determine whether an effect is present
or absent, but also calculate the difference in strength of
an effect produced by the additive effect of both causes,
"EE,” and the strength of an effect produced by only one
cause, ”E."
Although the results of this study suggested that
subjects consider the strength or magnitude of an event when
judging causality, and were able to conceptualize the
effects of different combinations of causes, it did not
provide conclusive evidence of linear discounting utilizing
graded causes and effects.

The results of this study could

be used to defend Shaver's (1981) model of discrete causes
if the results were discussed in terms of qualitative rather
than quantitative differences.

In other words, the effect

“EE" could be described as qualitatively different than the
effect "E," rather than simply a difference in strength.

To

determine which model best described the discounting process
Cunningham and Kelley found, a more quantitative study would
be needed.
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Anderson's information integration theory (1974)
perhaps presents the most conclusive evidence that
attributors discount by grading both causes and effects.
His quantitative analysis of Kelley's (1973) discounting and
augmentation principles indicated that subjects' perceptions
of the strength of a second causal factor were altered in
order to compensate for changes in the strength of the first
causal factor.

Furthermore, Anderson's analysis of data

from Jones, Davis, and Gergen (1961) provided quantitative
evidence for an additive model of graded causal factors.
This reanalysis failed to reveal a significant interaction
between the two causal factors, suggesting that attributors
recognized variations in the strength of effects as well as
causes in such a way that the sum of the attributed causal
strengths continued to equal the strength of the effect.
Anderson (1974) concluded that subjects used an
averaging model more often than a simple additive model.
These averaging models are similar to additive models, but
use the concept of weight as well as scale values.
Non-parallelism of attributed values confirms that the
weight of the scaled values is increased as a function of
perceived increases in the magnitude of an effect.

Plotting

data from Anderson and Butzin's (1974) study of judgments of
performance, motivation, and ability, Anderson found a
bilinear fan shape, illustrating use of a multiplicative
model.

This pattern of non-parallelism suggests that
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perceivers can attribute greater strength to causal forces
in such a manner that the product of the causal strength
continues to equal the strength of the effect, even as the
magnitude of the effect increases.
Despite the numerous studies that have found evidence
for high ambiguity regarding the presence of additional
causes when one cause sufficient to produce an effect is
known to be present, some studies have failed to show that
perceivers employ the discounting principle.

Not finding

evidence that perceivers experienced ambiguity regarding the
possible presence of a second cause, Kun, Murray, and Sredl
(1980) concluded that attributors use a variant-effects
schema rather than the multiple sufficient schema proposed
by Kelley (1972).

Based on their empirical findings, the

authors concluded that perceivers compare the strength of
the presented effect to the strength of a given cause.

In

contrast to the graded-effects schema that states that the
presence or absence of a second cause will be perceived
equally probable in any instance where an event is produced
in the presence of a sufficient cause, the variant-effects
schema hypothesizes that the attributor will infer that a
second cause is not present if the strength of the first
cause matches the strength of the event.

If, however, the

strength of the cause does not match the strength of the
event, the variant-effects schema hypothesizes that the
attributor will assume that a second cause was present.
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Because the attribution is made by comparing the strength of
the cause to the strength of the event, ambiguity regarding
the possible presence of multiple causes is minimized.
Although this study did not support Kelley's ambiguity
hypothesis, it nonetheless suggests both that subjects are
sensitive to discrepancies between the strength of a cause
and the magnitude of an event and that judgments involve
consideration of quantitative differences in the strength of
both causes and events.
Several other studies suggest that perceivers tend to
ignore completely the possible contribution of a second
causal factor when another sufficient cause is present
(Shaklee & Fischhoff, 1982; Smith, 1975).

The minimum

causation model of Shaklee and Fischhoff (1982) represents
an attempt to explain this observed failure to discount.
This model claims that attributors tend to be "lazy",
ignoring possible contributions of additional causes once a
single cause is found to be sufficient.

Shaklee and

Fischhoff's minimum causation model suggests that people
conduct a truncated serial search for information to help in
making cause-effect inferences.

According to Shaklee and

Fischhoff, pertinent information about one possible cause is
gathered before information is sought regarding other
potential causes.

Once a cause has been found to explain

adequately the described event, the perceiver is thought to
abandon the search for information regarding other potential
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causes.

Although this truncated search provides a

simplified attribution process, it also provides substantial
potential for mistaken attributional judgments.

If the

perceiver correctly identifies the single cause of an
effect, this strategy works well.

If, however, the

perceiver identifies an incorrect cause, this strategy does
not allow the gathering of information about other possible
causes that would allow the perceiver to recognize the
error.

Additionally, in the many instances of multiple

causes, the utilization of this strategy would lead to
incomplete attributions.

Without the identification of all

contributing forces, prediction and control of future events
is lessened.
In summary, numerous studies suggest that attributors
discount the importance of multiple causal elements in some
fashion.

Without direct comparison of Kelley's linear model

with Shaver's nonlinear model, however, it is impossible to
determine whether discounting proceeds in a linear or
nonlinear fashion.

To add to the mystery of discounting are

the several studies that have failed to find evidence of any
type of discounting (Pryor & Kriss, 1977; Shaklee &
Fischhoff, 1982; Smith & Miller, 1979).

These conflicting

results provide evidence of the difficulty inherent in
testing the discounting principle empirically (Shaver,
1981).
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The primary purpose of this study was to determine
whether discounting of probability and strength would
support Shaklee and Fischhoff's (1982) minimum causation
model, Kelley's graded causes model (1972), or Shaver's
multiple discrete cause model (1981).

Using trend component

analysis, probability and strength judgments were evaluated
for cause-event relationships with one, two, and three
causes.

Failure to find evidence of either linear or

quadratic discounting would support the minimum causation
model (Shaklee & Fischhoff, 1982), whereas a linear function
of discounting would support Kelley's causal schema model.
The presence of both linear and quadratic functions would
support Shaver's multiple discrete cause approach,
suggesting that subjects consider both nonredundant and
redundant causal subsets when discounting.
A second purpose of this study was to determine the
extent to which judgments regarding the presence or absence
of possible causes of a given event were transitive with
judgments regarding the presence or absence of events given
a particular set of causes.

Typical attribution research

presents subjects with an effect and asks for judgments
regarding the importance or probable presence of a proposed
cause or number of causes in the production of that effect.
Because researchers assume that subjects accept the
presented effect without question and concentrate solely on
determining the causal elements and the strength of each,
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rarely have studies presented causal elements as "givens"
and asked subjects to indicate their judgments of the
likelihood that the proposed event followed.
Yet, outside the social psychology laboratory, it is
not difficult to imagine the presence of potential causes
intended to produce a particular effect that fail to produce
this effect.

Consider, for example, a situation in which A

fires a gun at B.

Although the causal shot is fired, unless

A is an excellent marksman, there is a significant
probability that the event, injury to B, will not result.
Whether the event occurs or not will affect the magnitude of
perceiver's response to the perpetrator and the legal
charges brought against him or her.

Although this example

clearly indicates that the presence of a potential cause may
not lead to the production of the intended event, the
psychological study of causality makes the assumption that
the average attributor takes for granted the presence of the
typical effect when asked to evaluate the consequences of a
particular set of causes.

Without testing the' transitivity

of discounting practices, it is impossible to determine
whether this assumption is correct, or if attribution
studies are hampered by a high level of artificiality.
On the other hand, nontransitivity of discounting might
occur because particular causes are likely to produce a
limited number of events, whereas events can often be
produced by more numerous causes.

This might lead
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individuals to judge the probability of an event occurring
in the presence of a set of causes to be greater than the
probability that any one set of causes was responsible for a
particular event.
Nontransitive results might suggest that different
discounting models account for assessment of strength and
probability in the two directions.

Whereas the minimum

causation model (Shaklee & Fischhoff, 1982) suggests that
additional causal factors would not be considered once a
single factor was determined adequate, both the causal
schema model (Kelley, 1972) and the multiple discrete model
(Shaver, 1981) assume that attributional judgments often
involve multiple causal forces.

According to Kelley's

(1972) causal schema model, the overall probability of an
event increases with the addition of causal elements because
the addition of causal elements would lower the strength of
other causes necessary for the production of an event.
According to Shaver (1981), the introduction of additional
causes increases the probability of an event because the
additional causes increase the number of combinations of
causes that could lead to the event.

According to Shaver's

model, the perceived likelihood of an event should increase
more rapidly because perceivers evaluate both the redundant
and nonredundant combinations of causes.
Finally, this study addressed the question of whether
or not peoples' attributions differ depending on the
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situation in question.

Because the consequences of legal

attributions are often more binding and serious, it is
possible that more thorough, thoughtful attributional
searches are made for legal situations than for
interpersonal situations.

It is also possible that the

relatively rare occurrence of legal attributions would
result in attributions that would be more simple and naive
than attributions for interpersonal situations.

Although

there is little research comparing discounting attributions
for different types of situations, a study of the tendency
to make dispositional and situational attributions (Allen,
1985) showed significant differences in attributions for
different situations.

When asked to make trait attributions

for interpersonal (date, concert, assignment) and legal
situations (traffic ticket), trait attributions were higher
for the majority of the interpersonal situations than they
were for the legal situation.
The following hypotheses were made:
1.

Nontransitivity of discounting was predicted such

that subjects would disregard multiple causes when one cause
was found to be sufficient in the events-qiven condition,
whereas subjects in the causes-given condition would
consider each additional cause, increasing the perceived
probability that the event occurred as the number of causes
increased.

In other words, it was hypothesized that Shaklee

& Fischhoff's minimum causation model (1982) would be
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employed when events were presented and subjects were asked
to determine the importance of individual causes, whereas it
was predicted that discounting would be evident when causes
were presented and events predicted.

Thus, when causes were

presented, a main effect was predicted for number of causes,
such that as the number of causal elements increased, the
perceived likelihood of the event occurring would increase
significantly.

As stated earlier, discounting could show

evidence of either linear or non-linear changes as the
number of causes increased.

If the pattern of discounting

was linear, Kelley's causal schema model would be supported,
whereas more rapid, nonlinear discounting would provide
support for Shaver's multiple discrete schema model.
2.

Because the number of causes that can produce a

given effect typically is greater than the number of events
that can be produced by a particular cause or set of causes,
a significant main effect for experimental condition was
predicted such that the perceived probability that a set of
causal elements contributed to a given event was predicted
to be less than the perceived probability that a particular
event followed from given causal elements.
3.

Attributions for legal situations were predicted to

follow simpler rules of discounting than interpersonal
situations because legal and interpersonal attributions
differ on several dimensions.

First, legal situations

usually involve attributions made to a single human factor,
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with attributions to additional or intervening causes
playing relatively minor roles in judgments.

Thus, it was

predicted that subjects would be more likely to ignore the
influence of additional causes once a single cause was found
sufficient to explain a particular event in legal situations
than in interpersonal situations.

Additionally, these two

types of attributions are likely to differ because legal
attributions are not as common as interpersonal
attributions.

Lack of familiarity with legal attributions

was predicted to lead to reliance on simpler attribution
rules whereby the contribution of more than one potential
cause would be ignored when a single cause was found
sufficient to produce the event.

Thus, a significant

Situation by Number of Causes interaction was predicted such
that subjects would employ the minimum causation model
(Shaklee & Fischhoff, 1982) more consistently in legal
situations than in interpersonal situations.
Method
Subjects
In the main study, 65 male and 84 female undergraduates
participated in partial fulfillment of a research course
requirement.

Nineteen male and 20 female undergraduates

participated in pretesting of the stimulus materials.

All

subjects were told that they were participating in a study
of causal relationships and were assigned randomly to the
experimental conditions.
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Materials
Pretesting was conducted on 10 legal and 10
interpersonal situations used in previous attribution
studies conducted by Cunningham and Kelley (1975), Major
(1980), McArthur (1972), Schustack and Sternberg (1981) and
Shaklee and Fischhoff (1982) as well as situations created
by the author.

The six interpersonal and six legal

situations chosen for the main study were those found to
have the fewest additional causes and events judged possible
from the cause/event relationship and the fewest number of
mediating factors thought needed for the event to occur.
For both legal and interpersonal situations, two situations
were presented with one, two, and three causes.

In both the

events given and the causes given conditions, the number of
causes as well as the specific causes remained constant for
each cause-event association.
Pretesting
Groups of 9 or 10 students evaluated 10 legal and 10
interpersonal situations with three causes on one of four
dimensions during pretesting.

In each of the four

pretesting sessions, subjects evaluated the same 20 events
and the same three causes associated with the events.

The

purpose of these pretests was to identify six situations of
each type perceived to have the fewest number of mediating
causes, the fewest number of unsolicited effects and the
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fewest number of prompted and unprompted causal attributions
differing from those causes presented with the event.
The first pretesting measured the assumed causal
proximity of the presented causes to the events.

Ten

subjects were presented with the 2 0 situations and the
associated 1, 2, or 3 causes.

The subjects were asked to

list "any mediating forces that would have to occur between
the listed cause or causes and the final event".

This

pretesting excluded use of cause-event situations judged to
have more than two intervening causes.
The second pretesting evaluated the number of effects
subjects believed possible from the presence of the
presented cause or causes.

Ten subjects were presented with

the three causes associated with the above situations.
effects, however, were not presented to the subjects.

The
The

subjects were then asked to "list all events that could
occur in the presence of the cause or causes listed".

The

purpose of this pretesting was to compare events listed by
the subjects with the events associated with the cause-event
situations.

This pretesting identified situations with two

characteristics.

First, in comparison to the other

situations pretested, the particular event associated with
the cause-event pairing was more frequently listed by
subjects as leading to the event.

Second, given the listed

causal factors, few alternative events were though to be
possible.
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The third and fourth pretestings evaluated the numbers
of causal attributions made for presented effects.

The

third pretesting presented the subjects with the 2 0 events
without the corresponding causes.

The 10 subjects were

asked to "list all causes that would lead to the event".
This pretesting identified situations with two
characteristics.

First, this pretesting identified

situations in which the associated causes were most often
thought to be responsible for the presented event.
Additionally, cause-event situations with the least number
of causes not associated with the stimulus cause-event
situation were identified.

In the fourth pretesting, nine

subjects were presented with both the event and the three
causes associated with the event.

Subjects were asked to

"list any other causes that could lead to the presented
event".

The purpose of this pretesting was to identify the

cause-event situations with few potential causes differing
from those listed.
From the results of the pretesting, six interpersonal
and six legal situations were chosen for the main study.
The number of causes associated with each situation was
determined through the pretesting.

The events associated

with the fewest causes in pretesting became the "one-cause"
situations in the main study.

For these cause-event

associations, the cause most often cited during pretesting
was used as the one cause to be presented to subjects in the
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main study.

The events associated with the next fewest

causes became the "two-cause" situations in the study.
Again, the two causes most often cited during pretesting as
causes likely to lead to the effect were used as the two
causes to be presented to subjects in the main study.

For

the three-cause situations, the three causes presented
during pretesting were used during the main study.

The

pairing of causes and situations remained constant across
conditions.
Procedure
Sixty-five males and 84 females undergraduates
participated in the main study.

Subjects participated in

groups ranging in size from 16 to 26.

In both the

events-given and the causes-given conditions, subjects were
informed that they were taking part in a study of causal
relationships and were presented six legal and six
interpersonal situations.

For both interpersonal and legal

situations, two situations were presented with one cause,
two with two causes, and two with three causes.

To

determine whether discounting involved reductions in the
strength of each presented cause and event as well as the
probability of presence, subjects were asked to consider
changes in both strength and probability.
For each situation in the events-given condition,
subjects were given an event and one, two, or three possible
causes.

Subjects were asked to determine how probable it
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was that each cause contributed to the production of the
event independently of the other causes.

Probability was

measured on a 10-point scale with 1 meaning Not at all
Probable and 10 meaning Very Probable.

Subjects were then

asked to assume that the causes were present and were asked
to determine the strength of each cause independent of the
other causes on a 7-point scale with endpoints labeled Not
at all Important and Very Important.
In the causes-given condition, subjects were presented
with one, two, or three causes and asked to determine the
probability that a particular event resulted from the
presence of the cause or causes.

Probability was again

measured on a 10-point scale with 1 meaning Not at all
Probable and 10 meaning Very Probable.

Subjects were then

instructed to assume that the event actually did occur and
were asked to estimate the strength of the event on a
7-point scale with endpoints labeled Not at all Strong and
Very Strong.
At the end of each experimental session, subjects were
told that the research was studying the influence of
multiple causes on inferences regarding both the probability
and strength of events and causes in particular cause-event
situations.

Subjects were thanked for their participation

and were offered an opportunity to receive the final results
of the study.
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Results
In the events-given condition, subjects were given two
legal and two interpersonal situations with one, two, and
three possible causes each.

Asked to estimate the

probability and importance of each cause, subjects were
instructed to consider each cause separately regardless of
the number of potential causes presented.

In the

causes-given condition, subjects considered the same set of
six legal and six interpersonal situations.

In this

condition, however, the cause or causes were presented as a
group and the subject was asked to determine the likelihood
that the proposed event did occur, and the strength of the
occurrence given the cause or group of causes.

In this

experimental condition, the one, two, or three causes were
considered as a group whereas in the events-given condition,
the probability and strength of each causes was estimated
separately.

Because of this difference between conditions,

discounting processes in the multiple cause situations were
analyzed separately by condition.

In the events-given

condition, probabilities assigned to each of the causes in
the two and three potential cause situations were averaged
for each situation for the purpose of analysis.
Probability Estimates
Events-Given Condition.

It was predicted that

additional causes in the events-given condition would be
disregarded when one cause was found to be sufficient for
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the production of the event.

Thus, discounting was not

predicted to occur and subjects were predicted to use
Shaklee and Fischhoff's (1982) minimum causation model.

A 2

x 3 (Situation Type x Number of Causes) analysis of variance
with repeated measures on the number of causes variable
revealed a significant interaction, F (1, 68) = 4.84, p <
.01, suggesting that discounting proceeds differently for
different types of situations.

Trend component analysis

conducted on the data revealed a significant quadratic
component for the interaction term, F (1, 68) = 10.58, p <
.01.

Contrary to predictions, mean probability ratings for

legal situations indicated that subjects perceived the
probability that any particular cause was present to be
reduced as the number of causes increased from one (M =
6.69) to two (M = 6.08) to three causes (M = 5.29).

For

interpersonal situations, perceived probability also dropped
significantly as the number of potential causes increased
from one (M = 7.72) to three (M = 6.42).

The similar mean

probability rating for the two cause (M = 6.52) and the
three cause interpersonal situations (M = 6.42) indicate
that the amount of discounting for interpersonal situations
did not differ as a function of the number of additional
causes presented.

Insert Table 1 about here

34
Causes-Given Condition.

In the causes-given condition,

it was predicted that estimates of the probability of an
event occurring would increase as the number of presented
causes increased.

Thus, it was predicted that subjects

would use either Kelley's (1972) causal schema model or
Shaver's (1981) multiple discrete cause approach when
evaluating the probability of an event when given one, two,
or three causes.

Additionally, it was predicted that

probability estimates would show a less rapid increase for
legal situations than for interpersonal situations.

A 2 x 3

(Situation Type x Number of Causes) analysis of variance
with repeated measures on the number of causes variable
revealed a significant interaction term, F (2, 150) = 12.85,
p < .001.

Trend component analysis revealed a significant

linear component for the interaction term, F (1, 75) =
18.58, p < .001.

Unlike discounting in the events-given

condition, however, discounting in the causes-given
condition did not show a significant quadratic component,
indicating that the nature of the discounting function
differed depending on the direction of the attribution.
Inspection of the means in Table 1 suggests that people
estimated an event to be more likely as the number of causal
elements increased for interpersonal events, but not for
legal events.

Mean probability ratings for interpersonal

situations revealed probability increases when the number of
presented causes increased from one cause (M = 7.03) to two
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causes (M = 8.15) to three causes (M = 8.82).

For legal

situations, mean probability ratings remained fairly stable
as the number of presented causes increased from one (M =
6.68) to two (M = 6.76) to three (M = 6.90).
Strength Estimates
Predictions for the strength dependent variable were
similar to the predictions for the probability dependent
variable.

To test these predictions, 2 x 3

(Situation x

Number of Causes) analyses of variance with repeated
measures on the number of causes variable were conducted on
the dependent measure of strength for both the causes-given
and the events-given conditions.
Events-Given Condition.

In the events-given condition,

the results did not confirm the prediction of the minimum
causation model for either legal or interpersonal
situations.

The analysis of variance revealed a significant

main effect for number of causes, F (1, 68) =67.53, p <
.001.

Unlike discounting of probability, discounting of

strength showed no significant Situation x Type interaction
term.

Trend component analysis revealed a significant

quadratic component, F (1, 68) =4.88, p < .05.

As the

means listed in Table 2 indicate, mean importance ratings
for causes decreased for legal situations as the number of
proposed causes increased from one (M = 6.24) to two (M =
5.60) to three (M = 5.28).

For interpersonal situations,

mean importance ratings for the causes decreased in a
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similar pattern as the number of causes increased from one
(M = 6.35) to two (M = 5.72) to three (M = 5.35).

Insert Table 2 about here

Causes-Given Condition.

The analysis of variance

revealed a significant interaction term for event strength,
F (2, 150) = 9.62, p < .001.

A significant linear component

in the trend component analysis suggests that the changes in
the estimates of event strength occurred linearly, F (1, 75)
= 14.09, p < .001.

Listed in Table 2, the mean ratings for

event strength in the causes-given condition suggest that
people use different rules for making judgments in legal and
interpersonal situations.

For interpersonal situations,

mean event strength ratings increased as the number of
causes increased from one (M - 4.78) to two (M = 4.76) to
three (M = 4.97).

In contrast, however, judgments of event

strength in legal situations actually decreased as the
number of causes increased from one (M = 5.97) to two _(M =
5.66) to three (M = 5.22).
Test of Transitivity for One-Cause Situations
Because particular causes are likely to produce a
limited number of events, whereas events can often be
produced by countless causes, non-transitivity of
discounting was predicted such that probability and strength
judgments would be greater for the causes-given condition
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when probability and strength of an event were judged than
for the events-given condition where subjects judged the
probability and strength of proposed causes.

To determine

whether attributions made in the causes-given condition
matched attributions made in the events-given condition, 2 x
2 (Situation x Attribution Direction) analyses of variance
were conducted for both strength and probability dependent
variables for one-cause situations.
Probability.

The analysis of variance conducted on the

dependent variable of probability revealed a significant
Situation by Attribution Direction interaction, F (1, 143) =
4.54, p < .05.

Non-transitivity was obtained, although the

pattern of differences was opposite to the predicted
pattern.

As listed in Table 3, the mean probability rating

for interpersonal situations in the causes-given condition
(M = 7.03) was lower than the mean probability rating in the
events-given condition (M = 7.72), indicating that the
proposed cause was judged more probable than the
corresponding event.

Mean probability ratings did not

differ between the causes-given condition (M = 6.68) and the
events-given condition (M = 6.69) for legal situations,
suggesting that subjects judged the proposed cause equally
probable as its corresponding event.

Insert Table 3 about here
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Strength.

The analysis of variance on the dependent

variable of strength revealed a significant Situation by
Attribution Direction interaction, F (1, 143) = 35.94, p <
.001.

Mean strength ratings for interpersonal situations

were also lower in the causes-given condition (M = 4.78)
than in the events-given condition (M = 6.35).

Unlike mean

probability ratings, however, this trend was also seen in
the mean strength ratings for legal situation in the
causes-given condition (M = 5.97) and in the events-given
condition (M = 6.24).

Thus, subjects judged the importance

of a cause to be greater than the strength of the
corresponding event.
Storv Effects
Before concluding that different discounting processes
explain attributional judgments in different types of
situations, it is important to determine whether or not the
different situations used to represent the two different
types of situations, interpersonal and legal, were treated
similarly by subjects.

To determine whether or not subjects

appeared to use the same discounting rules for the various
situations within the categories of legal and interpersonal
situations, one of the two situations with each of one, two,
and three causes within each category was assigned randomly
to one of two groups, Group A or Group B.

Discounting

across these two sets of three situations was analyzed using
a 2 x 3 (Group X Number of Causes) ANOVA conducted
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separately for legal and interpersonal situations.
Significant interaction effects were found for both
interpersonal situations, F (2, 136) = 4 . 8 4 , p =
legal situations, F (2, 136) = 4.92, p =

.009.

.009, and
As Table 4

indicates, the amount of decrease in subjects' mean
probability ratings appears to be more dependent on the
particular situation, and perhaps the particular set of
causes under evaluation, than the number of possible causes
presented.

Insert Table 4 about here

Examination of the pattern of probability estimates
across causes in each situation with multiple causes would
provide information regarding the role of presentation order
in probability judgments.

Separate ANOVAs were conducted

for two and three cause situations of each situation type.
Comparison of probability judgments across the causes
presented in multiple cause situations revealed significant
interactions for interpersonal situations with three causes,
F (2, 136) = 67.48, p < .001, and for both three cause legal
situations, F (2, 136) = 69.96, p < .001, and two cause
legal situations, F (1, 68) =36.67, p < .001.

The pattern

of means listed in Table 5 suggests that subjects'
probability judgments are based primarily on the
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plausibility of individual causes rather than the order of
presentation.
Discussion
The results of this study suggest that subjects do not
make identical attributions when given an event and asked to
judge the probability or strength of a cause or causes as
they do when given a cause or causes and asked to judge the
probability or strength of a subsequent event.

Interaction

terms between legal and interpersonal events in both
directions suggest at first glance that discounting
practices differ depending on whether interpersonal or legal
situations are under consideration.

Further analysis,

however, indicates that subjects may be using different
discounting procedures depending on the particular situation
under evaluation rather than the category of situation.

The

different conclusions that can be drawn depending on whether
the results of this study are analyzed according to category
of attributional task or according to individual situation
are testament both to the difficulty inherent in studying
discounting and the need to develop a typology of situations
that might provide insight into the meaningful conceptual
distinctions between situations.

To evaluate the extent to

which conclusions would differ depending on whether
situations were grouped or whether situations were analyzed
separately, the conclusions that could be drawn using each
method of analysis will be compared.
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Legal versus Interpersonal Categorization of Situations
When an event is given and subjects are asked to
determine the likelihood that a cause or each of a number of
causes contributed to the event, discounting occurs in a
linear pattern for legal situations and a non-linear pattern
for interpersonal situations.

Thus, it appears that

Kelley's causal schema model of linear discounting is used
when judging legal situations.

Depending on whether the

slope changed more or less rapidly as the number of
presented causes increased, the non-linear pattern of
discounting observed in interpersonal situations could
indicate utilization of either Shaver's multiple discrete
cause approach or Shaklee and Fischhoff's minimum causation
model.

If the slope of the discounting function increased

as the number of causes increased, it would suggest that
subjects were using Shaver's multiple discrete cause model,
considering individual causes as well as combinations of
causes.

Examination of the results indicate that the amount

of discounting was equivalent for two and three cause
situations.

Thus, although subjects' predictions for events

with one cause differed from events with more than one
cause, predictions for events with two causes were similar
to those with three causes.

Because subjects discounted as

much for one additional cause as for two additional causes,
it appears that Shaklee and Fischhoff's (1982) minimum
causation model predicts discounting in interpersonal
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situations when subjects are given an event and asked to
determine the likelihood that a cause or each of a number of
causes contributed to the event.
When presented with one, two, or three causes and asked
to predict the likelihood of a particular event occurring,
subjects appear to use Kelley's (1972) causal schema model
of linear discounting for interpersonal situations.

This

linear function suggests that subjects consider each
additional cause presented, but not all possible
combinations of causes as would be predicted by Shaver's
model.

For legal situations, it appears that subjects used

a minimum causation model when judging the likelihood of a
legal event.

This model states that people disregard the

possible contribution of additional causes when a single
cause has been found sufficient to produce an event.
When asked to estimate the strength of a cause or each
of a number of causes that were responsible for the
production of a given event, the mean strength estimated
decreased in a nonlinear manner.

Unlike probability

estimates, strength estimates did not differ between legal
and interpersonal situations in the events-given condition.
When given a cause or causes and asked to determine the
strength of the resulting event, subjects' answers were
somewhat surprising.

Whereas estimates for interpersonal

situations remained fairly level, estimated event strength
for legal situations actually decreased as additional causes
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were presented.

This result appears counterintuitive; it

would be expected that the strength of an event would either
increase with the contribution of additional causes, or
perhaps stay stationary if the contribution of additional
causal forces was perceived to be superfluous to the
production of an event.

It is possible that subjects were

confused when asked to judge the strength of an event.
Whereas people frequently consider the strength of a cause
and the relationship between the strength of a cause and the
production of an event, it may be less common for people to
assess the actual strength of an event.

Instead of thinking

in terms of event strength, people often register only
whether an event occurred or not.

The unfamiliarity of the

concept of "event strength" was made evident by the number
of subjects who asked the experimenter to define the term.
Focusing on one-cause situations, comparison of
probability and strength attributions across the different
attribution directions for both legal and interpersonal
situations provides direct evidence that attributions are
not always made transitively.

The results of these

comparisons indicate that both probability and strength
estimates differed between the causes-given condition and
the events-given condition for interpersonal situations.
Judgments of interpersonal situations indicate higher
estimates of probability and strength of causes when the
event is given and probability or strength of possible
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causes is measured than when a cause is given and subjects
are asked to judge the probability and strength of an event.
In contrast, legal situations were attributed similar
probability and strength regardless of the direction of the
attribution.

Although strength inferences follow a pattern

similar to the pattern of probability inferences, one must
be cautious in interpreting the strength estimates because
many subjects appeared confused regarding the term "event
strength."
Discounting Within the Legal and Interpersonal Domains
Although categorization of the situations used in this
study into legal and interpersonal situations reveals a
complex pattern of attributions, the pattern of results
appears even more complex when attributions are analyzed for
each situation separately.

Clearly, the form of the

discounting function used is not dependent on the domain of
the situation in question.

Perhaps familiarity with

particular situations influences the attribution model used.
Specifically, individuals may have developed more complete
schemata for more frequently encountered or evaluated
situations, allowing for more complex attributional
decisions to be made for these situations.

When asked to

make judgments regarding less uncommon situations, the
attributor may rely on less developed schema.

As such, the

attributor may be unable to consider the influence of more
than one cause.

It is likely that situations within both
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the legal and interpersonal domains vary in terms of
familiarity.

Alternatively, discounting may be the result

of the use of cognitive heuristics such as salience,
representativeness, or availability (Fiske & Taylor, 1984).
These heuristics, involving differences in the ease of
recall or the strength of association between a cause and an
event, may influence the discounting process more than the
number of causes presented.
Summary
Despite the confusing picture painted by these results,
this study offers insight into the complexity of the
attribution process and the inconsistent manner by which the
naive attributor makes cause and event inferences.

At

times, the lay person appears to consider only one cause,
whereas at other times he or she appears able to evaluate
the possible contributions of additional causes.

This study

provides little evidence that subjects consider various
combinations of potential causes.
These results suggest that no single discounting model
can adequately describe the attribution process.

Further

research is needed to determine the limits of each model and
to outline the circumstances under which each is used.
Failure to find transitivity of probability
attributions points to a flaw in the assumptions inherent in
most attribution research.

Most studies present an event as

a given, rather than as an uncertainty.

When these studies
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conclude that subjects automatically discount causes when
more than one cause is presented, possible changes in
perceptions of the likelihood of the event occurring are not
considered.

Discounting implies that less additional

information can be gathered by studying each successive
additional cause.

This is true if the probability of an

event is assumed to be stable, but not if the likelihood of
an event changes as new causes are added.

It is quite

probable that research supporting the discounting principle
places structure on the attribution task that is not present
in everyday attribution situations where event probability
is considered.
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Table 1
Mean Probability Scores for One, Two, and Three Cause
Situations For Events Given and Causes Given Legal and
Interpersonal Situations

Number of Causes

One

Two

M

6. 69

6.08

5.29

SD

1.44

1.33

1.25

M

7.72

6.51

6.42

SD

1.30

1.17

1.19

M

6. 68

6.76

6.90

SD

1.81

1.60

2.11

M

7.03

8.15

8.82

SD

1.68

1. 35

1.47

Condition

Three

Events-given
Legal

Interpersonal

Causes-given
Legal

Interpersonal

Note.

Probability measured on a 10 point scale.
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Table 2
Mean Strength Scores For One. Two, and Three Cause
Situations For Events Given and Causes Given Legal and
Interpersonal Situations

Number of Causes

One

Two

M

6.24

5.60

5.28

SD

0.78

0.86

0.69

M

6.35

5.72

5.35

SD

0.61

0.68

0.80

M

5.97

5.66

5.22

SD

0.86

0.80

1.20

M

4.78

4.76

4.97

SD

1.41

1.15

1.44

Condition

Three

Events-given
Legal

Interpersonal

Causes-given
Legal

Interpersonal

Note.

Strength measured on a 7 point scale.
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Table 3
Mean Probability and Strength Estimates for One Cause Legal
and Interoersonal Situations in Events Given and Causes
Given Conditions

Condition
Eventsgiven

Dependent Measure

Causesgiven

Probability
Legal

Interpersonal

M

6.69

6. 68

SD

1.44

1.81

M

7.72

7.03

SD

1.30

1.68

M

6.24

5.97

SD

0.78

0.86

M

6. 35

4.78

SD

0.61

1.41

Strength
Legal

Interpersonal

Note.

Probability was measured on a 10 point scale and
strength was measured on a 7 point scale.
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Table 4
Mean Probability Ratings for Causes for Each of the Six
Interpersonal and Six Legal Situations

Number of Causes
One

Two

Three

Group A

8.00

6.52

6.93

Group B

7.45

6.51

5.92

Group A

7.10

5.93

5.11

Group B

6.28

6.24

5.47

Interpersonal

Legal
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Table 5
Probability Estimates for Each Cause Presented in Multiole
Cause Situations as a Function of Presentation Order

Presentation Order
Condition

First

Second

6.09

6.96

6.26

6.75

5.87

6.61

7.07

4.78

5.62

7.07

8.09

6.25

6.39

5.13

6.64

3.23

6.54

3.91

6.00

5.42

Third

Two Cause
Interpersonal
Situation A
Situation B
Legal
Situation A
Situation B
Three Cause
Interpersonal
Situation A
Situation B
Legal
Situation A
Situation B
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Figure 1 .

Compensatory Schema for an Event with Two Causes

Cause 2

Cause 1

Absent
Low
Moderate
High
__________ Strength______Strength____ Strength
Absent

Effect

Effect

Low
Strength

Effect

Effect

Moderate
Strength

Effect

Effect

Effect

Effect

High
Strength

Effect

Effect

Effect

Effect
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